Over 100,000 years between undetected transmission errors...

The EtherCAT Safety protocol uses a single-channel communication system for transferring both safe and non-safe information. The transport medium is regarded as a 'black channel' and thus independent of safety considerations. The same holds for intrinsic error correction. This means that safety data can also be transferred via other communication systems such as true Ethernet or foreign fieldbus systems.

Safety functions tend to be developed separately from automation functions and only integrated into the machine concept at a later stage. This often leads to cumbersome and inflexible solutions that may even restrict machine operation. In addition, with a safety function that limits the functionality of the machine, there is always a risk that the user will circumvent it.

However, there is a trend in a new direction: Intelligent safety solutions in the automation components and communication systems themselves permit integration of safety technology into the machine design. In the sphere of safety sensors these are safety devices that already integrate functional extensions such as muting. Recent developments include camera-based sensor systems with spatial monitoring to give new operator/machine interaction options for area protection.

For evaluation and safety logic – additional to large safety controllers – small, local logic devices are already offered that are scalable to suit the task in hand. Inflexible relay logic thus becomes a thing of the past.

Drive technology also offers integrated safety functions for such things as fast stop and safe velocity limitation monitoring.

The EtherCAT Safety protocol uses a single-channel communication system for transferring both safe and non-safe information. The transport medium is regarded as a 'black channel' and thus independent of safety considerations. The same holds for intrinsic error correction. This means that safety data can also be transferred via other communication systems such as true Ethernet or foreign fieldbus systems.

Safety over EtherCAT protocol

The standards world also started addressing the new circumstances as a basic prerequisite resulting in set procedures for determining specific safety levels for software-based, programmable safety devices with the evolution of IEC61508, IEC62061 and ISO13849 definitions. The benefits include:

- Seamless integration of the safety concept into the machine design;
- No separate development tools for standard and safety application;
- Simple handling and transparent safety functions;
- Effective diagnostic options for the safety functions;
- Single communication system for control and safety information;
- No performance limitations in terms of real-time and determinism;
- Flexible expansion options.

To realise safe data communication over EtherCAT, the following features were considered crucial during development of the protocol:

- Compliance with SIL 3 of IEC61508;
- Safe and non-safe information on the same communication system;
- Independence of the protocol from the transfer system and medium;
- The length of the safe process data is not restricted by the protocol;
- Very short frame lengths are possible;
- No limitations with regard to transfer speed and cycle time.

Compliance with the requirements of IEC61508 SIL 3 is essential for unrestricted use in the context of industrial automation. For the bus system this means that the dangerous residual error probability of $<10^{-9}$ per hour must be met. This corresponds to 1% of the residual error rate of $\geq 10^{-5}$ to $<10^{-4}$ required for SIL 3 in a system with stringent requirements; the other 99% are reserved for other safety components such as sensors, safety logic and actuators involved in realising the safety function. Incidentally, $<10^{-8}$ per hour means that no dangerous error must occur and remain undetected during continuous operation over 100,000 years.

Distribution of residual fault rate in a safety system

EtherCAT is used as a single-channel communication system for transferring safe and non-safe information. The transport medium is regarded as a 'black channel' and not included in safety considerations. A safety frame containing the safe process data and the required data backup is included in the process data. This container is safety-analysed in the devices at the application level.

Communication remains single-channel. This corresponds to Model A from the Annex of pre-IEC61784-3. This standard, which is currently being finalised, describes requirements for the transfer of safety-relevant messages in industrial networks.

The calculation of the residual error probability for the protocol takes no credit from the error detection mechanisms of the communication system. This means that the protocol can also be transferred via other communication systems. This is used, for example, in internal sub-bus systems for modular I/O system components, which have a Bus Coupler for connection to the control bus system and have their own sub-bus for gathering the process image of the I/O components used. The EtherCAT Bus Coupler can forward the safety frame without credit from the error detection mechanisms of the communication system. This means that the protocol can also be transferred via other communication systems. This is used, for example, in internal sub-bus systems for modular I/O system components, which have a Bus Coupler for connection to the control bus system and have their own sub-bus for gathering the process image of the I/O components used. The EtherCAT Bus Coupler can forward the safety frame without restrictions to the safe I/O terminals via the sub-bus.
The Safety technology

A basic principle for testing and certification of bus systems for transferring safety-relevant messages was first presented in 2000 by the HVBG electrical engineering committee. The basic testing principle specified in the current version [GS-ET-26] is the basis for the international IEC61784-3 standard. This standard defines the following error assumptions for such a network: corruption, repetition, interchanging, loss, delay, insertion, masquerading and invalid addressing of messages. A safety protocol must be able to handle all these errors via suitable measures, i.e., they must be detected according to the required safety category.

The message delay assumption is particularly relevant for Ethernet-based systems. The application of non-safety-certified infrastructure components such as switches or routers creates scope for message delays. Even time monitoring (watchdog) of arriving messages is not sufficient. Delays are safely detected by the watchdog. In the network component the messages are initiated by the master and acknowledged by the slave. The state also involves exchange and acknowledgement of information for the communication relation. The watchdog time is exchanged in the connection. A unique session-number for detecting interchange, repetition, insertion or loss of whole messages is required safety category.

For controlling the other errors, the protocol also includes:
- A CRC checksum for detecting message corruption from source to sink.
- A unique connection ID and a unique slave address for safely detecting misrouted messages via a unique address relationship.
- A sequence number for detecting interchange, repetition, insertion or loss of whole messages.

Using suitable procedures, the frame is designed such that a minimum container length of six bytes is sufficient for transferring all error detection and correction information, including one byte of safe process data. Incidentally, the protocol does not impose any limits regarding the length of safe process data. This means that safety components with many bytes of safe process data are also supported. For example, in addition to safe state information, a safe drive may also transfer the internally determined safe position, safe speed and/or safe torque – and there is no limit regarding the minimum cycle time of the container. With appropriate selection of the error detection and correction information, the transfer rate has no influence on residual error probability for the Safety over EtherCAT protocol.

Protocol in operation

During startup of a Safety over EtherCAT connection, a state machine is processed both in the master and in the slave. Here too, the focus was on a simple structure in order to make implementation as simple as possible. State transitions are initiated by the master and acknowledged by the slave. The state also involves exchange and checking of information for the communication relation. The watchdog time is exchanged in the parameter state for example. This time is strongly dependent on the transmission link and on the safety devices. It therefore has to be configured individually.

Safe application parameters may also be transferred from the master to the slave in this state. This allows safe central data management in the master. The application parameters can be up to 216 bytes long per connection, which is sufficient for transferring a configured protective field of a laser scanner, for example.

The safe output state can only quit in the data state. This state is the normal operating state for exchanging safe input and output data. If one of the devices detects a communication relation error during startup or data exchange, it changes to reset state, thereby resetting the connection.

Certification

The Safety protocol has been assessed by TÜV and duly certified for transferring process data between devices up to SIL 3 according to IEC61508. The implementation of the protocol in a device must meet the requirements of the safety target. The associated product-specific...
requirements must be taken into account.

Any transmission link can be used, including fieldbus systems, Ethernet or similar transfer routes, optical fibre cables, copper cables, or radio links. There are no restrictions or requirements for Bus Couplers or other devices located along the transfer route. A conformance test for supporting implementation of the protocol in devices is currently being developed. This checks the compliance behaviour of the safety protocol via the communication interface of a test device.

The first step is reading the device description file for the test device in order to determine the possible parameters for the testing. Test scripts from a configuration can then be executed on a standard PC. The test device is subjected to correct and faulty frames and the response is compared with an expected result. A test report summarises the results of the individual test steps.

The test cases are reviewed and approved by a test centre and may be used by the device manufacturer for ensuring conformity with the protocol specification. The establishment of an independent conformance test laboratory has been proposed. This laboratory will carry out tests and certify conformity. The certification authority of the device manufacturer is thus able to approve the safety functionality of this protocol. However, the test does not cover the implementation (e.g. two-channel calculation) of the Safety over EtherCAT protocol. As for safe application of the device, this has to be done by the manufacturer according to the requirements of the safety target of the certifying authority.

Application example
Safety components are used wherever they are required in the automation system. Scalable local input and output components can be included. An additional input or output may be extended flexibly using safety and non-safety Bus Terminals as required.

The safety logic is also embedded within the network strand. A standard PLC can thus continue dealing with control tasks without a safety extension. Safe input and output functions are linked in the local safety logic in the form of an intelligent, safe Bus Terminal. This does away with the need for an expensive safety PLC and enables scaling of the logic according to the task at hand. Only the messages between the Safety over EtherCAT master and the allocated safe slaves are routed via the non-safe, standard PLC.

Beckhoff currently offers three safe I/O components: an input terminal with four safe inputs, an output terminal with four safe outputs, and a Logic Terminal with configurable safety logic and four local safe outputs. Safety-relevant parameterisation of the devices can be implemented via a safe configuration tool integrated in the standard programming environment (TwinCAT). Finally, the resulting safe parameter set is uploaded (password monitored) to the safe logic terminal. During each startup, the Logic Terminal distributes the safe application parameters to the configured input and output terminals. This enables simple exchange of input and output terminals without having to adapt or reload the configuration.